Trump’s tough talk may not force Pak to change

American President Donald Trump’s new Afghan policy was announced in a speech on Monday night, though he had earlier given ad hoc approval to his military commanders to boost the 8,400 US troops, in an international force of 13,000, if exigent, after a comprehensive review, ordered by Mr Trump and conducted by US defence secretary James Mattis, of “all strategic options in Afghanistan and South Asia” was completed. The widened focus is notable, making some in India fear that it may re-hyphenate India-Pakistan. Alternatively, it enables India to insert its concerns as the new policy gets implemented.

Mr Trump candidly admitted that he was modifying his stand on non-intervention in wars abroad after a different perspective from “behind the desk at the Oval Office”. But he was really addressing his home base, earlier represented by sacked political adviser Steve Bannon, who had  opposed any further US embroilment in Afghanistan, favouring instead outsourced security to contractors like Blackwater.

Mr Trump made two basic arguments. One, that US troop withdrawal, without reconciliation on the ground, would create a vacuum that the Taliban, Al Qaeda and ISIS would exploit. Two, he went on to spell out how the premature US withdrawal from Iraq had created conditions for the rise of ISIS. He could have added that the Taliban had resurfaced in Afghanistan in 2005 only after the US shifted bulk of its fighting force to Iraq for deposing Saddam Hussein in 2003, assuming their disappearance into the welcoming arms of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) as their rout.  

The United States, Mr Trump said, must seek “an honourable and enduring outcome worthy of the tremendous sacrifices that have been made...” This is nebulous and would be difficult to quantify, particularly when he later argues that the US no longer favours “nation-building”. So the objective he is setting for the US military is, as he articulated elsewhere, defeating terrorists and ensuring that they do not seize nuclear weapons. The US will fight to win, he reiterated, obliterating ISIS, Al Qaeda and preventing the Taliban from overrunning Afghanistan. Clearly Pakistan’s favourite anti-India jihadi outfits are not on Mr Trump’s to-do list and may be negotiable entities so long as Pakistan plays along on Afghanistan.

The tactics to achieve this objective are then spelt out. Mr Trump correctly rectifies the Obama approach of a slow draw-down of troops, restricting their role to training and away from combat duties and emphasis on timelines. Mr Trump agrees with his top generals that to reveal details of military strategy plays into the antagonists’ hands. Mr Trump, calling it the core of his new strategy, says the US is shifting from a time-based approach to a “conditions” based plan. This is to ensure that the Taliban do not “wait us out”, as he puts it.

The US would also use diplomatic, military and economic instruments in required measure. This is not new as the US has in the past employed them in the region. Gen Joseph L. Vettel, the commander of Central Command, which covers the region, was in Pakistan to apparently urge a cost-benefit analysis of its abetment of terror in neighbouring countries. Mr Trump called it the next pillar, saying the US can no longer ignore “Pakistan’s safe havens for terrorist organisations”. Pakistan has much to lose by so continuing. Mr Trump finger-pointed and said these groups have been targeting Americans and “that will have to change”. Pakistan needs to demonstrate commitment to civilisation, order and peace.

Is this the President George W. Bush moment post-9/11 revisited when then Pakistan President Gen. Pervez Musharraf was asked whether he was with the US or not? Only time will tell whether the Pakistani military decides to change, but this is as clear a warning and indictment of Pakistan as publicly possible from a US President. But past experience is that Pakistan will adapt tactically, show some cooperation and even sacrifice some assets who are anyway troublesome and then await Mr Trump’s embroilment elsewhere.

A surge will undoubtedly roll back the Taliban’s gains, although this summer they have been unable to capture any provincial capital or major city. But the question remains whether the US’ go-it-alone policy is viable in the long run. Iran and Russia have a close working alliance in West Asia to support the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, which they will extend to Afghanistan. China is distracted by North Korea’s standoff with the US and its allies Japan and South Korea, which can relapse into hostilities. It would not want its other ally Pakistan to suck it into a South Asian quagmire. The Taliban too isn’t relying on Pakistan alone as evidence mounts of aiding and abetting by Russia and Iran.

What then to make of the prominence given to India in Mr Trump’s new  Afghan Doctrine? He compliments, and then takes a swipe by expecting more economic assistance for Afghanistan from India because of the dollars earned from India-US trade, and finally revives the nuclear flashpoint thesis. It would be advisable for India not to gloat over the US’ Pakistan bashing as Trumpian logic can take convoluted paths, including a settlement of the Kashmir issue as a carrot for Pakistan.  India should expect some military escalation in Afghanistan, perhaps even some withholding of aid to Pakistan, but the Chinese will hold the Pakistanis’ hand and help them negotiate the moment of crisis.

All told, the best course for India will be to wait and watch, not tie itself to Mr Trump’s Don Quixote-like voyage through the region and keep Russia in good humour. Perhaps China may also realise that the onus for the US reviving its role in the region is entirely on its inability to share strategic space with other Asian powers and restrain its surrogates — Pakistan and North Korea. This tests the usefulness of Brics, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as well as RIC, a trilateral forum of Russia, India and China, as instruments for crisis avoidance and cooperation.