Keep windows open for the world

Prime Minister Narendra Modi did not allow political roadblocks on the domestic front — defeat in Delhi and Bihar and a dysfunctional Parliament — to impact his hectic foreign itinerary. The year began with a visit by US President Barack Obama who was the chief guest at India’s 66th Republic Day and ended with Mr Modi’s visit to Russia. The Prime Minister was in a number of countries, with major visits in Asia — China, South Korea, Malaysia and Singapore — while also travelling to Germany, Canada, United States, United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates. In the immediate neighbourhood, Mr Modi visited Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. The Indo-Africa Summit held in New Delhi in October 2015 was also dubbed a success.

While it has become fashionable to give report cards on foreign policy, it is a work in progress, and it is a tad frivolous to deliver a verdict on whether Mr Modi’s visits have been successful or not, because a number of agreements (in the economic and strategic sphere) which have been inked will take time. Yet, some trends are clearly visible, and so are some changes evident in Mr Modi foreign policy of 2015, as opposed to 2014.

During his overseas visits, Modi has assiduously tried to give the impression that he means business. His focus in most countries has been on reaching out to the corporates and overseas Indian communities.

One change clearly evident in 2015 was that global corporates are now “cautiously optimistic” about India. India now seems to be an attractive destination for investments though red tape still remains a red flag even though India has jumped 12 places to the 130th position on the World Bank’s “ease of doing business” index. Mr Modi’s popularity with the diaspora was evident in the US West Coast and the Silicon Valley in September 2015. As is evident from his interactions, he has used these opportunities not just to list the achievements of his own government, but also to urge foreign nations to be part of the Indian growth story in different ways.

While this outreach is laudable and one tool of foreign policy, it should have its limits. Post the Bihar election defeat, Mr Modi’s interactions with the diaspora were not very different in nature, though he refrained from making remarks against previous governments.

The neighbourhood has posed problems. Not just Pakistan but even in Nepal the Modi government has been accused of bungling. In the case of Pakistan, the government has had to resume dialogue after a series of setbacks. Mr Modi’s phone call to his Pakistani counterpart in February 2015, on the eve of the cricket World Cup, as well as the visit of the Indian foreign secretary to Pakistan, clearly show that Mr Modi was not averse to resumption of engagement with Pakistan and was ready for course correction. But it was only the meeting in Paris (at COP21), away from the media glare, which actually paved the way for resumption of engagement. Union minister for external affairs Sushma Swaraj’s visit to Islamabad for the Heart of Asia conference, where she briefly met her Pakistani counterpart Sartaj Aziz and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on December 9, came amid efforts by both sides to improve the relationship.

There are two views on whether or not India intervened excessively on the Madhesi issue in Nepal. But India clearly lost the perception battle and the goodwill generated during the Indian Prime Minister’s visits in 2014, first for a bilateral and then for the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (Saarc) summit. In both instances, it has been argued that domestic politics played a role. With Pakistan, Mr Modi has been cautious, fearful of being perceived as weak-kneed after running an aggressive campaign, whereas the government was accused by some of being excessively obtrusive and pushy on the “Madhesi’ issue with an eye on the Assembly elections in Bihar.

This is interesting because the current government is the first to have received a clear mandate after a period of 30 years and, unlike the United Progressive Alliance which had to pander to the demands of regional parties, Mr Modi faces no such constraints. But his neighbourhood policy has been coloured by domestic politics, which, it looks like, will continue to play a role in ties with all countries in different ways.

Domestic politics will play a role in ties with all countries in different ways. Countries like the US, the UK, China and Japan will be eagerly awaiting the required economic reforms.

On strategic issues, immense progress has been made in the context of Indo-US and India-Japan ties.

The foundations of both were, of course, laid by Mr Modi’s predecessor, Manmohan Singh, though this is not acknowledged. In the case of the US, defence ties between both countries are already witnessing an upswing, and the trilateral partnership between India, Japan and the US has also blossomed.

Mr Modi will need to stand his ground on foreign policy because several Assembly elections are on the anvil. For instance, in West Bengal and Assam, Pakistan will not be an issue, but Bangladesh is likely to be and contentious issues like migration could have an adverse impact on bilateral relationship.

In the case of Pakistan, Mr Modi would be best advised to focus on trade and economic ties, while leaving enough room for manoeuvre. In this context, the approach of the earlier government, especially Dr Singh from 2011-2013, when the thrust was clearly on trade and commerce, would be the right template. The two Punjabs can play a positive role in this context, as there are strong lobbies on both sides which understand the relevance of a dynamic economic relationship.

In other countries, too, it is important to be involved but not to be seen as obtrusive and paternalistic, this includes not just Saarc neighbours, but even Myanmar where, after a security operation, Mr Modi’s overzealous colleagues made indiscreet statements.

There is a difference between being pro-active and patronising. In conclusion, it is also important to understand that there is less hype around Mr Modi’s initiatives, both by the media and his government, and a realisation that it is national interests — economic and strategic — which will shape bilateral relations; personal chemistry and symbolism are crucial add-ons, not determinants.

Second, while Mr Modi has tried to give importance to a number of countries, there are a number of important omissions like Indonesia, with which India has not just historical links, but can also find common cause in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.

In conclusion, Mr Modi has tried to add new dimensions to India’s dealings with the outside world, exhibiting pragmatism on many issues, but there is no escape from the fact that he needs to build consensus domestically as well, not just in context of ties with neighbours but also other parts of the world. Also, Mr Modi needs to have good relations with chief ministers of different parties, not just those belonging to the Bharatiya Janata Party, to ensure that India is more successful in drawing foreign direct investment. The writer is a senior research associate with the Jindal School of International Affairs, OP Jindal Global University