Manipur’s curse

Out of the 65 terror organisations in India, 57 are Northeast-based and of that 34 are based in Manipur. Earlier in June, the deadliest attack on the Indian Army in 33 years, resulting in the deaths of 20 soldiers of the 6 Dogra regiment, took place in Manipur’s Chandel district bordering Myanmar.

Manipuri insurgency dates back to the time of merger of the princely state with the Indian Union in 1949. Subsequently, loss of identity, inadequate socio-economic integration, failed negotiations and armed ethnic conflicts amongst the competing communities within the state ensured a violent state of insurgency. With the valley dominated by Meities (60 per cent) and the hills by the Kukis and the Nagas — each group has its own historical, commercial and perceived hostility towards the other, leading to the rise of their own armed insurgent groups that “protect” their tribe, religion, culture, geographical turfs and tax collection points. Unlike neighbouring Mizoram, which is a classic case of a counter-insurgency success, the political integration and civil/economic rehabilitation of the Manipuri people has been fractured by the violent history of the heterogeneous groups and hawkish support from China, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and even by the Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan.

Tactical arrangements and asymmetrical alliances between competing groups to share the eco-system and its spoils has been fair game — the June attack was ostensibly at the behest of United Liberation Front of Western South East Asia (UNLFW), a conglomerate of United Liberation Front of Assam (Independent), Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang), Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (Songbijit). According to Indian intelligence, the UNLFW was formed in Taga area of Myanmar, the seeds of its formation were sowed at a meeting in Ruili in China’s Yunnan province in 2011. The insurgent groups closed ranks to remain effective and relevant on ground in the face of pressure from Indian counter-insurgency forces. Myanmar is the closest sanctuary of insurgent camps with tactical and fluctuating support by the Burmese junta.

After the ambush at Chandel, revenge via counter-attack by the elite 21 Special Forces (Para) inside Myanmar was swift and clinical, inflicting what were called “significant casualties” on the insurgent groups (purportedly facilitated by the officials in Delhi and Yangon). Though, Myanmar still has to come clean on its tacit support for some of the insurgent groups. Operations of NSCN(K), based in Myanmar, led by S.S. Khaplang, also the “president” of the composite UNLFW has been a sore point between the two countries. Khaplang was supposed to have signed a ceasefire with the Thein Sein-led Myanmar junta in 2012. Not surprisingly, he was not part of the Indian government’s Naga peace accord, which was signed with the NSCN (Isak-Muivah) group, earlier this year. The Khaplang faction has been kept out of the negotiation talks by the Indian authorities.

Given Manipur’s geographical proximity with NSCN(K) camps across the border and the perennial internal strife amongst the various other Manipuri groups and factions, Manipur bears the brunt of north-eastern insurgency, whilst the other seven north-eastern states are relatively calmer than before.

Manipur’s main Meitie insurgent groups trace their armed disillusionment to a sense of revivalism against Bengali Hindu Vaishnavism in the 1930s and the need to protect the old Meitie religion. This aggravated with a sense of undoing post accession to India, with a feeling of hostility towards outsiders or Mayangs, who were considered to be usurping the economic benefits for and chipping away at the traditional supremacy of the Meities.

The delay in the grant of statehood and inclusion of Manipuri as a scheduled language were the other irritants that ensured the angst and ire against Delhi. The main valley-based groups are People’s Liberation Army of Manipur (PLA) and the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) and a host of other groups like the Kanglei Yawol Kunna Lup (KYKL), Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) and People’s United Liberation Front (PULF). However, the spillover of the politics of “Greater Nagalim” into Manipur (which has Naga population in the hills) made the insurgents even more strident and popular among the irritable and wary Meities.

Manipur is contiguous with Nagaland and the rival non-Nagas, especially the Kukis, have harboured intense rivalry and have their own “Kukiland” agenda and turf wars with the Nagas in the hills (most Kuki insurgents are under “suspension of operations” vis-à-vis the Indian defence forces and usually deploy their strength against the other Meitie and Naga groups).

Besides insurgency, tribal rivalry, underdevelopment, corruption (taxes imposed by insurgents), smuggling, drug trafficking and the clandestine role by China and Myanmar to retain strategic lever of power, has ensured inadequate development and ripe socio-economic conditions for insurgency to fester. State elections are rigged and proxy candidates ensure the siphoning of the developmental funds by the insurgent groups, denying economic impetus and continued crisis of “identity” vis-à-vis Delhi.

This unholy nexus requires political, diplomatic and administrative innovation and integration along with a parallel military approach to act as a force-multiplier to bring about the required change (as done in Mizoram).

The fact is that overall socio-economic deprivation feeds popular public support for insurgency and, to break the chains of insurgency, a committed multi-pronged approach is required internally and externally by aligning Myanmar to joint-operations on both sides of the borders to uproot insurgent camps. Tangible and visible economic investments (beyond funding state politicians, which is replete with corruption and inefficiency) must be undertaken and deployed directly from the Centre, as there is enough economic rationale to invest in and realise the Look East policy by India via states like Manipur. Security should be committed for the timely completion of development projects and workers. A strategic “naming-and-shaming” approach of the Chinese handiwork at all international forums will put pressure on Beijing to pull back from its adventurism in the region.

An honest cost-benefit analysis of continued support for insurgents versus tangible development and upliftment has to be established with communities within and across the border with Myanmar. Today, Manipur remains the most complex and bleeding insurgency for India in the Northeast.

The writer is former lieutenant-governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry