Terai key to better India-Nepal ties

The dramatic downturn in India-Nepal relations in recent weeks raises a number of questions. What was it that precipitated India’s interventionist approach, on the eve of Nepal promulgating its Constitution and in the days following, knowing that it was bound to unleash a wave of nationalistic anti-India sentiment and strengthen resistance to suggestions for its amendment, thereby undermining hopes of a new era in bilateral relations generated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visits to Nepal and later by the spontaneous and generous Indian response to the April earthquake

The argument in some quarters in New Delhi is that throughout the Constitution drafting process, its concerns were communicated frankly but privately to Nepal’s leaders across the political spectrum. These covered key provisions which seemed to ignore the legitimate expectations of a vast chunk of Nepal’s population alongside its border with India — the Madhesis, Tharus and Janjatis in particular — and violate formal commitments given by previous governments or enshrined in deliberations of the previous Constituent Assembly. A handful of leaders from the main parties in Nepal, secure in the numbers that they enjoyed in the Constituent Assembly, were, however, determined to push the statute through, despite the fact that parties representing the Terai groups were boycotting the entire process. In the fortnight before Nepal endorsed and finally promulgated the Constitution, the Terai erupted in protests which were put down with some brutality. Apart from vague assurances that grievances would be addressed in due course, leaders representing the major parties were clearly not interested in serious accommodation with the agitating groups or even in giving credible assurances. Kathmandu seemed to be deliberately underestimating the growing fear and increasing anger at the level of ordinary people on India’s border. India could not be a passive spectator if the process went ahead, ignoring the agitation, bloodshed and violence in the Terai.

The visit of India’s foreign secretary S. Jaishankar to Nepal on the eve of formal promulgation of the Constitution was aimed at underlining India’s concern that operationalising the Constitution in its present form could be a recipe for disaster for Nepal, and might seriously complicate India-Nepal relations. The response of the key actors in Kathmandu was to ignore India’s advice, dismiss the visit as badly timed and go ahead with the promulgation.

The contrary view in Nepal was that India’s fears and concerns were misplaced or exaggerated and its diplomacy has been severely counterproductive. The priority after the April earthquake was to secure a Constitution after seven years of political dithering, as without a Constitution nothing — including post-earthquake reconstruction — was feasible. Any attempt at forging a consensus (as India had suggested at the highest level) was doomed to fail, as had happened with the first Constituent Assembly: the issue of federal demarcation was too divisive. Any shortcomings would be addressed in due course, as happens with all Constitutions, including India’s. India was, in addition to creating serious misunderstanding about its intentions, churlish in not welcoming the Constitution as a major achievement, and short-sighted in backing the Madhesis, thereby fortifying the conventional suspicion in the hills that they were Indian agents and not loyal Nepalese.

Nepal would now have no option but to diversify its relations and turn to other countries, primarily China. (China has already responded positively to Nepal’s SOS for petroleum, indicating a possible stepping up of Sino-Indian competition in Nepal.

In recent weeks, the agitations across the border have continued, preventing the movement of goods. There has been a virtual breakdown of private and commercial transportation due to the shortage of petroleum. Repeated appeals to New Delhi by the new government under Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli to lift the “unofficial blockade” have elicited equally repetitive Indian responses of helplessness, with the clear message that Nepal should first address the grievances of its people in border areas before the security needed for normal transit facilities is ensured.

The rise in anti-Indian sentiment has spread far beyond the traditional confines of the Kathmandu Valley. In India, there is a suspicion that some elements are deliberately stoking anti-India feelings, as it provides a convenient cloak to continue inactivity on the key concerns of the plains people.

The India-Nepal relationship is now severely dented. It matters less now as to which side was responsible for the original sin, and its possible motivations. A post-mortem of the misjudgements and communication failures on one side or another can wait. The focus now should be on how to contain the damage already done. Statesmanship of a high order, restraint and flexibility on all sides, including by the Terai-based groups, is essential. It is a hopeful sign that discussions between the Kathmandu government and Madhesi representatives seem to be making progress on the three core demands of the latter (securing proportional representation in state jobs, fair empowerment through population based constituencies, and a redrawing of the federal map based on past understandings), even as high level contacts between New Delhi and the new government in Kathmandu are on the increase and congestion at the entry points to Nepal from India are easing.

Mr Oli comes to the Prime Minister’s job with a reputation for being anti-Madhesi and anti-India. This was not always so. This is the same man who in earlier incarnations had impressed with his pragmatism and political courage.

Now that India has made its point, at some cost to itself as well as to Nepal, Mr Oli could be given the necessary space to accommodate excluded sections of the population through a credible process of mutual internal accommodation. Once the Terai finds comfort in and gains a sense of ownership about the Constitution, Prime Ministers Modi and Oli will have their work cut out for them, and the search for regaining mutual trust and rebooting the India-Nepal relationship can then begin in right earnest.

The writer, a former Indian ambassador to Nepal, is convenor of the Nepal Support Contact Group in New Delhi