The Long March to LEMOA

The signing of a defence logistics support agreement by India and the United States is an important marker in bilateral relations and an example of the two countries overcoming the “hesitations of history.”

The evocative phrase was used by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his address to the US Congress in June amid cheers. No one could have wagered that Modi would move so quickly on an agreement that India had resisted for 12 long years out of fear it would bring New Delhi too close for comfort to the US.

Some strategic analysts are disturbed by the idea of a strategic embrace even if they accept the logic of India building stronger ties with the US. In the most negative assessment of the agreement, one analyst called it India’s “most serious strategic mistake” in seven decades mainly because it would force Russia to move ever closer to China and Pakistan in an axis against India.

Many of the misgivings about the agreement stem from misinformation, including a persistent fear that Americans can now have bases in India. The more imaginative have even claimed that American GIs are coming to father illicit children in India.

In light of such criticism, some of it ideological, it is important to examine what the logistics support agreement actually entails and whether it automatically means India joining hands in America’s constant military adventures. Simply put, it doesn’t. It allows the two armed forces to help each other with food, fuel, storage, medical services, repair, spare parts and storage facilities in times of need.

The standard template of the agreement, which can be found on the Internet with a simple search, shows it is more a facilitator and places no obligations on India to follow America into battle. The US has signed logistics agreements with more than 60 countries, both allies and non-allies.

The one with the Philippines, a US military ally, makes clear that the agreement would be “implemented, applied and interpreted” by the parties in accordance to their respective constitutions, national laws and regulations.

Given political sensitivities, India forced not just a name change, resulting in an inelegant title but also textual changes to limit its scope and give India an out. The Indian defence ministry has said the agreement “would be used exclusively during authorized port visits, joint exercises, joint training, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts.” It would help if the text of the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement or LeMOA were made public but given the government’s tendency towards secrecy, it’s unlikely.

So why did Modi rush in where Manmohan Singh feared to tread The signing of LeMOA on Monday during Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar’s visit to Washington was perhaps as much a result of quashing hesitations of history as recognizing the rapid changes in India’s external environment.

Over the past three years, China has made its presence felt more aggressively than before, producing islands from rocks, building military installations on them, declaring an air defence zone, threatening neighbors, attacking fishing boats and generally marking territory.

The last straw for the Indian government was perhaps the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor or CPEC, which would go through disputed territory. Two of India’s most difficult and dangerous neighbors are going to be tied by the one-belt-one-road initiative of Chinese President Xi Jinping. India sees CPEC as a strategic move, not purely an economic one. Besides, Modi’s ardent courtship of Xi didn’t produce desired results either on moving border talks along or isolating Pakistani terrorists. What he got was a series of snubs – China blocked India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group while protecting Pakistan’s Masood Azhar from UN sanctions.

Indian defence policy can’t remain static in the face of Chinese assertiveness and expansionist behavior. It has to use a bigger tool kit. While critics have focused on what LeMOA can do for the US, it’s useful to see how this agreement expands Indian Navy’s reach by providing access to US bases in Diego Garcia and Djibouti.

China opened its first overseas base in Djibouti earlier this year, a move that made military strategists sit up and take notice, to say nothing of its constant intrusions into India’s neighbourhood. It’s silly to see China’s state-controlled media issue warnings about how India signing LeMOA may “irritate China, Pakistan or even Russia.” Indian irritation has been far greater with the China-Pakistan nuclear, missile and terror alliance -- a big reason among other compelling reasons why India has moved closer to Washington over the years.

Modi took the unprecedented step of issuing a joint vision statement with President Barack Obama in January 2016 to send a smoking signal to China. The statement talked about “the importance of safeguarding security and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea” where China is busy rubbing everyone’s nose.

Yes, for all practical purposes India has shed the garb of non-alignment – Modi is not attending the NAM summit -- but one could argue it doesn’t mean automatic alignment with the US on all issues. In fact, there is a marked divergence on US policy towards Pakistan, notwithstanding boilerplate statements by visiting Obama cabinet members.

Americans recognize and are slowly accepting that India will never be a traditional ally. It needs special treatment and acceptance on its own terms. They are under no illusion that they will fire from Indian shoulders now or any time soon.

A new playbook is being developed as we speak. The US government now treats India on a par with its “allies” in terms of technology transfer. It is willing to share jet engine and aircraft carrier technology – even the most optimistic wouldn’t have predicted that a decade ago.

The only real question for India is Russia’s reaction to the new Indo-American friendship society. Can New Delhi keep Moscow truly engaged with cash and contracts and work on Washington to focus on the real adversary instead of rivals long defanged