Abhijit Bhattacharyya | Time to restructure Indian Navy's Command, Control'

Is India taking note of the crucial role which naval forces are playing in the land wars of Europe and the Levant? Or the unprecedented rise in Chinese naval aggression, which is constantly hunting anyone and everyone in the seas around the South Asia coastline? Isn’t India feeling the heat of the Communist Party of China’s People’s Liberation Army and Navy’s hostile acts in and around India’s Exclusive Economic Zone and over islands adjacent to New Delhi’s 4,104 nautical mile coastline?
It’s time for India’s establishment to recognise the emergency-like situation that requires restructuring of the command, control and forward deployment of naval forces in its own region. There is no other non-Western Navy like India that could be peacefully deployed or is qualified to help at least 20 Indian Ocean rim states in the way India’s seamen are operating across the Bab el Mandeb, Arabian Sea and the Red Sea waters.

In the Middle East, while India has good relations with the Jewish state and friendly ties with most of its neighbours, as well as the Gulf emirates, all of which have a large Indian diaspora, the erratic behaviour of the Houthi rebels in the Red Sea and terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas bring the unpredictability factor, even though they may not have any serious issues with India or its professional Navy. The great unknown factor that might affect the sea routes between Europe and Asia are the activities of the PLA Navy -- should it extend its domineering conduct around the South China Sea to the Bay of Bengal, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean!

The geopolitical scenario for India indeed is becoming more complicated, with the conventional land and territorial issues spilling over water with far-reaching consequences. The latest grave provocations originate from a shaky, erratic and misguided Maldives establishment. In its eagerness to demonstrate its strategic importance and play a “larger than life” role in the sea, it has unwittingly stirred the beehive. China has clearly got a willing and pliable Lilliput inside India’s EEZ. The Indian Navy will now have to get more assertive in these waters, as it cannot allow such arm-twisting at the behest of an outside power. The need for a restructuring of the Indian Navy’s command and control, and of modifying its fleet deployment, has become extremely urgent.

The Navy has three regional Command, Visakhapatnam (East), Mumbai (West) and Kochi (South). Effectively, however, only the East and West are operational commands, with the South in charge of training. This writer believes that the Navy must prepare to expand and strengthen its teeth by upgrading all its bases. Let Kochi be the “Training, Ship Building and Maintenance Command”. Besides Vizag and Mumbai, Laccadive and Minicoy can be made the new South-West Naval Command, with long-range and offensive capable ships, submarines and air wing. The Andamans Tri-Services Command must be expanded further to make it a full-fledged self-sufficient command. Two frontier states in the west and east -- Gujarat and West Bengal – must be urgently upgraded with two fleets (though not necessarily under a three-star vice-admiral), with independent operational responsibility and capability.

The Chinese, one must remember, have already penetrated deep into all three neighbouring navies -- of Myanmar, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Submarines, frigates, destroyers and corvettes are all sourced by Dhaka, Naypitaw and Islamabad from Beijing, thereby banking on spares, logistics and maintenance; all influenced by Chinese naval doctrine on ops against India, the biggest naval power in South Asia.
True, India’s targets are not Bangladesh or Myanmar, but the Chinese PLA Navy’s vessels are brazenly lurking in the vicinity, using these country’s ports. On Pakistan, it’s a different ballgame owing to the congenital defective psyche and inferiority complex of Islamabad’s Army generals born out of the surrender in Dhaka in December 1971. Both Bangladesh and Pakistan today have four naval bases each with small shoreline of 367 nautical miles (Dhaka) and 567 nautical miles (Islamabad), in comparison to India’s 4,104 nautical miles along with mid-ocean islands. The Chinese are cunningly eyeing India’s South Asian neighbours’ ports and naval bases under the garb of the Belt and Road Initiative.

Also, while India’s seven Army and seven Air Force Commands have to keep vigil over 32.88 lakh sq km of territory, the Navy, with two operational commands, has to survey and do surveillance of 7,05,40,000 sq km of Indian Ocean and the two comparatively smaller water bodies of the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea. The waters around India are now becoming choppier by the day. Today’s Black Sea and Red Sea hostilities clearly show that the mightiest of warships have vulnerabilities, and are often shaken by small, minuscule boats with agile sailors operating small arms like drones and missiles.
The Russian fleet’s repeated failures in the Black Sea and the US aircraft- carrier strike groups facing trouble handling the non-state Houthi rebels are a clear warning to all conventional navies. The problem arises due to big ships operating in small seas, shallow waters and restricted spaces, which make it hard to manoeuvre. The dispersal of fleets, sailors and command structures is thus the preferable way out. The concentration of too many ships in a single port or single command can spell disaster. Pearl Harbour in December 1941 is a classic example, so is the Pakistan Navy’s treatment in Karachi port in December 1971.

Since then, Pakistan has dispersed its fleet across 567 nautical miles, while Bangladesh’s 386 nautical miles also has four naval bases. The naval infrastructure of each of India’s neighbours has fallen into Chinese hands. Therefore, it is vital for the Indian fleet to disperse, deploy and destroy with multiple commands with different types of combat vessels.

India’s unique advantage is its ability to do “forward deployment” without being 10,000 km away from its forward bases, unlike the US and British navies in relation to Guam, Guadalcanal, Okinawa or Falklands. India’s own islands are there for our Navy to dock, develop and deploy to take on all those sailing down the adjacent sea lanes. India’s islands, both west and east, are natural runways for long-range maritime patrol, reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare and very low frequency (VLF) listening posts for sub-surface adversary flotillas with bases in the strategic mouths of waterways. In addition, satellite communications and high-altitude aerial photos in mid-ocean islands will add to overall preparedness of the Navy’s mission. It’s time, therefore, for India to push for a radical expansion and upgrade of command/combat preparedness around all its bodies. Any delay could lead to a future disaster like 1962.

(The writer is an alumnus of the National Defence College, New Delhi. The views expressed here are personal)