K.C. Singh | Frozen India-Pak ties need relook amidst power shift

India-Pakistan relations have virtually disappeared from the public discourse in India over the last few years. Late diplomat Satinder Lambah’s memoir In Pursuit of Peace, published posthumously, appears to have revived it. At a book release function, handled deftly by Mrs Nina Lambah, four former Indian high commissioners to Pakistan debated the issue.

Having worked with six Indian Prime Ministers, Lambah sketches the relations between the two South Asian neighbours through 75 years of engagement or detachment. As the Prime Minister’s special envoy for back-channel talks for over a decade, he reveals the journey to the elusive four-point deal to resolve the Kashmir tangle, finalised but never signed. Gen. Pervez Musharraf’s domestic missteps and his eventual ouster in 2008 blighted the deal.

But more than the historical perspective, what is of greater contemporary relevance is what two of the high commissioners alluded to. They wondered whether old approaches are even imaginable under the changed domestic politics of both nations. In Pakistan, the Islamisation which President Zia-ul Haq began in the 1980s has touched a new dimension.

Ambassador Lambah calls it “reverse osmosis” in view of the fringe now bidding to be the mainstream. Former Prime Minister Imran Khan is more unabashedly Islamist than any of his predecessors. National elections are due in Pakistan no later than October 14. Mr Khan’s rabble-rousing, mixing religion, xenophobia and nationalism, may receive popular approval. Fearing this, the ruling dispensation may try postponing the polls hoping that his support ebbs. But he is the one-man Opposition that the new alliance of former rivals — Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) and Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) — are now confronting. The danger is that the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TPP), aided by the ruling Taliban regime in Afghanistan, has penetrated deeper into Pakistan. Whereas in the past their terrorist attacks were confined to Pakistan’s tribal areas, now they are all across, especially in Pakistan’s Punjab.

In India too, with crucial state elections coming up, months before the Lok Sabha polls in mid-2024, police encounters to eliminate mobsters of one faith and historical revisionism affecting school textbooks are indicative of a rightward lunge. This may be a tactical move by the BJP to overcome the anti-incumbency of their 10-year rule. A frustrated former governor has revived the debate over the 2019 Pulwama attack, that triggered a military response by India in Balakot. Undoubtedly the BJP benefited electorally from the nationalistic upsurge that arose.

Furthermore, the geopolitical environment has also evolved. In the aftermath of the Galwan clash in June 2020, the India-China standoff and Pakistan’s economic meltdown has enhanced strategic convergence between Pakistan and China. Ambassador Lambah recounts that historically Pakistan got emboldened whenever a big power threw its weight behind it. The 1965 India-Pakistan war was planned by Pakistan after receiving more advanced US defence equipment, including fighter jets, on joining anti-Communist alliances created by the United States. Similarly, once the US and the Saudis recruited Pakistan to train the mujahideen for fighting the Soviet Union’s forces in Afghanistan after 1979, Pakistan was able to get yet more military aid and clandestinely develop its strategic nuclear programme with no Western disruption. This toxic alliance was responsible for the birth of global terror and Islamic radicalisation.

Having developed its nuclear deterrent, Pakistan chose to abet terror against India assuming immunity from India’s superior military power.

Also to be noted is the recent realignment of forces in the Gulf, revealing a more active Chinese posture. China arranged détente between arch-rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Unsurprisingly, the Saudis and Chinese are at the forefront of rescuing Pakistan from bankruptcy and thus enabling a deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Russia, a joker in the pack, has been drawn into a deeper engagement with this group. The Saudis again led in the OPEC-Plus group deciding oil production cuts, defying US advice.

The exchange of prisoners in Yemen indicates that the civil war is tapering off. There is speculation that Saudi King Salman bin Abdul Aziz may visit Tehran.

Against this backdrop, is it wise for India to persist with frozen ties with Pakistan? It is true that diminished terrorist attacks may be due to the government treating Kashmir as a purely domestic issue. It may also be due to Pakistan’s economic crisis and distractions on its western front where the Taliban are not exactly being the pliable allies that Pakistan had expected. Decades of Pakistani support and protection under the very nose of the US had proven to be a bad investment.

Allowing Pakistan to degrade as a functioning state may not be in India’s interest. If a normal Pakistan is difficult enough to deal with, imagine one controlled by neo-Taliban elements. Even the Pakistan Army may not be able to escape being controlled by even more bigoted generals. Ambassador Lambah correctly points out that historically more agreements have been reached with Pakistan when the Army directly controlled political power. One example of the disruptive role of the Pakistan Army is that after Gen. Pervez Musharraf handed over the Army chief’s position to Gen. Ashfaq P. Kayani on November 29, 2007, the Army’s support for the back-channel talks flagged. Eventually after President Pervez Musharraf lost power in August 2008, the 26/11 attack on Mumbai was green flagged. Gen. Kayani was, coincidentally, the first head of the ISI to become Army chief.

Returning to the Lambah book ceremony, the consensus among the four former high commissioners to Pakistan was that engagement with Pakistan is unavoidable. The most obvious reason is that it is unwise to allow Pakistan to slip deeper under Chinese control.

Pakistanis in the past have been shrewd to balance relations with China with close ties with the US and the Gulf sheikhdoms. They did so by proving useful strategically or tactically. In 2004, US President George W. Bush declared Pakistan as a “major non-Nato ally”, liberalising the export of arms. Recently, a bill has been tabled by a US congressman to revoke that designation.

It is unlikely the Indian government will risk engaging with Pakistan with less than a year to go before the Lok Sabha elections. Any major terror attack after such an outreach can cause huge political embarrassment. Likewise, for Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, responding positively to India could expose his flank to Imran Khan unless at least the Jammu and Kashmir statehood is restored.

The next phase of the India-Pakistan detente will have to wait till the national elections are over in both countries, subject to the caveat of course that statesmen assume power.