Signs of thaw on the Korean peninsula?

The surprise offer of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in his New Year message for participating in the Winter Olympics in South Korea next month has set off a chain of events, which may have major consequences for the Korean peninsula and beyond.

The South Korean government led by the liberal President Moon Jae-in quickly responded positively and invited North Korea for talks at Panmunjom truce village at the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) between the two long warring nations. The talks between the minister-level delegations of the two sides on January 9 have been constructive with tangible outcomes and without any effort by either side to score propaganda points. The two sides have agreed that North Korea would send a delegation to the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics to reinstate the military hotline snapped by the North two years back and to hold military talks to defuse the military tension on the peninsula. The joint statement issued after the talks states: “South and North Korea have decided to make joint efforts for the unity of the people and reconciliation by establishing an environment for peace and easing military tensions on the Korean peninsula.”

On its part South Korea raised two other issues. On the proposal for the reunion of separated family members on the two sides of the border on the Lunar New Year next month, North Korea was non-committal. On the most important issue of denuclearisation of the peninsula, North Korean delegation declined to engage.

In this rapid unfolding of events both the US and China seem to have had only a marginal supportive role. President Donald Trump in his tweet on January 4 claimed that North Korea would not have agreed for the talks if “I wasn’t firm, strong and willing to commit our total ‘might’ against the North”. This may indeed be partially correct, as the latest sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council on December 22 have severely restricted the supply of fuel to the North. The North’s attempts for clandestine purchase of vital fuel have been hit by firm action by South Korea when it seized two ships, which had delivered fuel to North Korean vessels on the high seas.

President Moon must have been relived at the acquiescence of President Trump for the talks. In his New Year press conference on January 10 after the talks, he profusely thanked President Trump for the “huge contribution” to bringing the North and South together for the landmark talks. President Moon added that he would be willing to meet North Korean leader Mr Kim, but wouldn’t have a “a meeting for the sake of the meeting”. He also called for North Korea to move towards denuclearisation — a plea which is unlikely to find any response from the North.

President Moon has repeatedly made it clear that his first priority is that war must not break out on the Korean peninsula again. He has also always stated his goal “to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem”, but clearly it is his second priority.

This approach is in contrast to President Trump’s threats of war against the North if it continues on the path of repeated nuclear and missile tests. President Trump has publicly committed that North Korea would not be permitted to acquire the capacity of a nuclear strike on the mainland United States. He is prepared to take military action against the North to stop the North in its tracks and this threat petrifies the South Korean leadership. Any military action against the North has the potential to quickly escalate in a total war with severe damage to both North and South Korea.

North Korea has signalled that its quest for nuclear weapons is not directed against the South and this argument has found resonance among the South Korean leaders as well as the masses. Seoul has not witnessed any mass demonstration against the repeated nuclear and missile tests of the North during 2017.

It is unlikely that North Korea would undertake any provocation till the conclusion of the Winter Olympics next month. But its actions after that would depend on whether its scientists feel the need for further missile and nuclear tests to refine their dependability. Notably, while North Korea claims that it has acquired the capability to strike at the US mainland most experts doubt that it has developed the technology to miniaturise the nuclear warhead, fit it on an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and ensure its re-entry in the atmosphere after the launch. However, North’s technical capacity to acquire these technologies in a year or two is not doubted anymore.

In advocating unconditional talks with the North, President Moon is pursuing the path followed by his two liberal predecessors — President Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun — who had historic summit meetings with then North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. As the then Chief of Staff of President Roh, President Moon had fully participated in the implementation of the “Sunshine” policy towards the North. But this soft and unilaterally conciliatory approach is likely to rile the United States.

The main players in this unfolding drama — the US, Japan and South Korea — are still pursuing a mirage of a denuclearised North Korea. They are not yet prepared to accept that a nuclear-armed North Korea is a reality that cannot be reversed. There is clear divergence in perceptions and responses of the countries involved in the six-party talks. Russia and China are advocating for accommodation by the US, thus signalling that they would accept a nuclear-armed North Korea. Japan is keeping its options open but the North Korean threat has been cleverly leveraged by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to secure greater acceptance among the pacifist Japanese masses for a more robust, active and outgoing foreign policy and speedier militarisation.

South Korean polity is divided on accepting a nuclear North. The majority believes that the North Korean nuclear bombs are not against the South but only to neutralise the existential threat from the United States. But an economic giant South Korea will be always vulnerable to pressure from a nuclear-armed North. Would South Korean people accept this imbalance in their relations with the North? Would the extended nuclear deterrence provided at present by the US still be dependable when North acquires a credible deterrence against the US? These are tough policy issues, which would need to be addressed by the South Korean leadership and people.

Will the US also be forced to accept and deal with a nuclear North Korea? This is a proverbial million dollar question which only the future can answer. There may be signs of a thaw on the Korean peninsula but thaw in the frozen relations between the US and North Korea are nowhere on the horizon.

The writer is a retired ambassador