Any examination of the Narendra Modi government’s first two years in office should be done from three perspectives — first, to assess his political evaluation in dealing with allies and adversaries; second, the Modi government must be measured for the work it has done and to study the gap, if any, between promise and delivery; and finally, we should explore what strategies the Prime Minister and his team need to use in order to secure another term in 2019.
Mr Modi came into office with his own unique set of strengths and weaknesses. Has he succeeded in removing the weaknesses and reinforcing the strengths One of his biggest weaknesses was his perceived inability to work with others and to get things done with gentle persuasion. Mr Modi believed in a more forceful style — “to make an adversary an offer which he (or she) can’t refuse” — and disliked coalitions.
His own party secured a clear majority in the Lok Sabha but it still remains a political partnership. Mr Modi needed to learn how to work effectively with the Opposition, that is essential in our parliamentary system. Barring the odd leader of a rival party, Mr Modi and his close aides do not have close friends outside the saffron camp. But his failure to secure the cooperation of the Opposition is more his loss, not that of his opponents, because incumbents have to seek a fresh mandate on the basis of their own accomplishments. In 2019, Mr Modi cannot go to the people and say that he couldn’t deliver on his promises because the Congress did not cooperate!
Mr Modi came to power promising “vikas” and “badlav” (development and transformation). But the biggest change came in the social sphere, in which India’s pluralism came under attack in instances such as “Love Jihad” and ultra-nationalism. The damage that this has caused to the Indian polity over two years is far-reaching and poses a threat to the stability and unity of the country. About badlav, there are questions on which of the minor changes actually has Mr Modi’s imprint, and if that was what was expected of him
As chief minister, Mr Modi could maintain tight control over the Gujarat government, but while it could work in a small state, this style is hard to replicate at the national level, with the Prime Minister’s Office as the sole initiator of policy. South Block was mobilised immediately after Mr Modi took charge, and the electoral victories in Maharashtra, Haryana and Jharkhand were seen as proof of the success of this strategy. But the setbacks in 2015 led to a change in strategy in Assam, and should indicate that centralisation of power does not always work. But no basic changes have been made in the functioning of the government, and there is only one boss. Though officials have clear-cut roles in the PMO, no one has ownership. Vertical heads must have the power to function, but now everyone is horizontally placed below one chief.
Mr Modi continues to come up with good ideas and has announced several of them. Jan Dhan Yojana, Swachchh Bharat, Make in India and Namami Gange are just some. The success with financial inclusion (not entirely an original idea) and the failure with Swachchh Bharat are indicative of Mr Modi’s strengths and weaknesses. He is gifted when it comes to re-energising moribund departments but fails when it comes to creating fresh architecture or new systems to achieve the objective.
Delegating authority does not come easily to the Prime Minister. Ministries are not policymaking centres and only push files upwards, where they remain stuck for long due to overload. Instead of raising the number of stakeholders, Mr Modi’s approach is to reduce them. The bureaucracy was initially enthusiastic that the government will give officers an opportunity to think after outsourcing the job to the National Advisory Council in the UPA years. But after realising that contemplation is reserved for just a few, the officers go through the motions as any initiative may threaten their insecure seniors.
Mr Modi set the ball rolling in Gujarat on many initiatives after bypassing the system and doing the paperwork only after execution of the projects. This may have been possible at the state level, it is not feasible in Delhi. Mr Modi has as a result got bogged down in a bureaucratic maze, and he may have to unlearn some of the lessons he learnt in Gandhinagar to get his work done in New Delhi.
Mr Modi has offered us a peep into his possible electoral plank ahead of 2019 by stressing initiatives like girl child education, Swachchh Bharat, construction of toilets in schools and homes, Jan Dhan Yojana, Digital India, rural electrification and the soil health card. These are all good schemes but it is uncertain how far they will win votes. For that he must generate jobs, and playing around with data to project a false sense of hope won’t help. “Green shoots” is a good expression for boardrooms, but not in barren fields and in lengthening lines of jobless.
As Mr Modi prepares for a crucial year ahead, he must infuse the spirit of the Assam campaign in his government, where everything is not centred around him. Mr Modi gave other leaders a lot of leeway in Assam, and similarly he should delegate more authority to his colleagues in the government to get things going. Crucial elections are due in 2017, and in Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat he may be tempted to opt again for the “proxy CM” model. But this may prevent him from letting the system unclog and will eventually choke his chances of returning to power in 2019.
The writer is the author of Narendra Modi: The Man, the Times and Sikhs: The Untold Agony of 1984
