It is now exactly 55 years after the India-China War or, what was then the more popular term, the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. Conflict, and not war, because it was confined to only a few battle formations of both the opposing armies with only 10 days of actual fighting even though hostilities lasted a month. In an extremely well written account of the 1962 war, in his famous book, Himalayan Blunder, Brigadier J.P. Dalvi, who commanded a brigade in North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA), and was taken a prisoner of war (PoW), refers to 1962 as a “national failure of which every Indian is guilty. It was a failure in the higher direction of war, a failure of the Opposition, a failure of the responsible public opinion and the press.” China’s “stab in the back” adversely effected the reputation and careers of many important personalities — both military and civil. Two of the most promising careers that were cut short as a consequence of the Chinese debacle were those of defence minister V.K. Krishna Menon and Lt. Gen. B.M. Kaul who was GoC of 4 Corps that was responsible for the defence of NEFA.
Menon took over as the defence minister in 1957. Known for his dynamism and bright intellect, Menon’s induction in the ministry was well received by senior officers of all the three services. A trusted colleague and admirer of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Menon soon began to implement his leader’s vision of self-reliance and reducing the armed forces dependence on foreign countries for arms and ammunition. He proposed doubling of the officer strength of the Army but his proposal was opposed by finance minister Morarji Desai and surprisingly even by Gen. K.S. Thimayya, then Chief of Army Staff. Menon, however, managed to double the strength of the National Cadet Corps (NCC) in his first four years as defence minister. He also brought up an Auxiliary Cadet Corps to train youth in team spirit and discipline. Menon earned tremendous goodwill of armed forces personnel when he raised their payscales, pensions and took a number of steps for the welfare of troops and their families. Though largely the Prime Minister’s initiative, it was during Menon’s tenure as defence minister that a National Defence College (NDC) to train senior officers of defence and civil services in strategic and international affairs, the College of Civil Engineering (CME) and the Armed Forces Medical College (AFMC) were set up.
However, in his later years as defence minister, Menon rubbed a number of senior officers on the wrong side. His lethal tongue and verbal aggressiveness earned him many enemies both in higher defence circles and also within Nehru’s Cabinet. Besides finance minister Desai, home minister G.B. Pant considered Menon a Communist and opposed everything Menon proposed in the Cabinet. According to his biographer T.J.S. Gorge “it was the finance minister who frustrated Menon’s effort for enhancing the military budget”. The defence minister also spoke of Desai’s personal antagonism towards him. He could have brought up the issue in the Cabinet if he was being obstructed by Desai and Pant.
Though Menon concentrated his energies on defence production, towards which his contribution was remarkable, he neglected defence preparedness. This was perhaps due to his ideological orientation. Under tremendous public and parliamentarians’ pressure, Menon had to submit his resignation to the Cabinet, which Nehru unwillingly accepted. The Prime Minister didn’t want to make a scapegoat of his long time and trusted colleague because as the executive head he knew more than everyone else that it was not the fault of a few individuals, but the entire system, which included hims as the leader of the nation.
Like Menon, Chief of Army Staff Gen. P.N. Thapar, was asked to submit his resignation in the middle of war but it was Lt. Gen. B.M. Kaul, Commander of the Corps facing the Chinese onslaught who suffered the most serious setback to any senior Army officer in the 1962 war. “Bijji” Kaul had attained such a profile that his name was mentioned by Welles Hangen in his bestseller, After Nehru, Who? as a possible successor to Nehru. To have one’s name mentioned along with Desai, Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indira Gandhi, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit and Jayaprakash Narayan (JP) meant that Kaul had risen to that stature due to his diligence and capability. According to the author of The Guilty Men of 1962, D.R. Mankekar, Kaul “nursed political ambition and fostered a legend woven around his energy, fearlessness, courage and austere living.”
Before he took over as Corps Commander, Kaul was the Chief of General Staff (CGS) at Army Headquarters. Earlier, Quarter Master General (QMG) Kaul was highly successful and saw through a speedy development of building roads along the northern borders, though the programme was circumvented by Chinese attack. When he was appointed the CGS in March 1961, Kaul became aware of the quantum and urgency of building up defences on the northern border. During the 16 months he held the post he addressed at least eight letters to the defence stressing upon the urgency of equipping the Army for fighting in the bleak, high altitudes of the northern border. But the defence minister did not realise the urgency of the situation. As late as January 1962, he remarked that “the India-China border dispute is not of such magnitude that could precipitate a war”.
Gen. Kaul was blamed for recommending the “forward policy” of planting posts along the frontier, which precipitated the Chinese attack when the Army was not yet prepared for it. Yet another charge against Kaul was that whereas the Prime Minister’s directive on the forward policy made it clear that they should operate from logistically firm bases and not go indiscriminately forward, the CGS ordered the troops to go wildly forward without considerations of logistics. On October 3, Kaul was made commander of a newly raised 4 Corps for the defence of NEFA. Hardly had he taken over when he fell seriously ill and had to be evacuated to Delhi. But he recovered soon and resumed his charge at the time when the Chinese were preparing to launch the second phase of their attack in NEFA on November 14. Kaul had to bear full responsibility for the series of reverses that followed till the Chinese declared a unilateral ceasefire on the night of November 20-21.
China’s perfidy, however, proved a “blessing in disguise”. Nehru’s high moral stature in the world ensured massive military and economic assistance from the US, UK, France and later from the Soviet Union, which decided to set up a MIG factory in India. By 1965, the country was fully prepared and a well-equipped military machine gave a befitting reply to Pakistan and, as in 1947-48, repulsed its attempt to annex Kashmir by force. But 1962 proved too costly for both Menon and Kaul. The former may not have succeeded Nehru but could well have ended his innings at the Rashtrapati Bhavan or at least as the vice-president. Kaul, on the other hand, had every chance of becoming Army Chief. If not, his career would certainly have ended as a governor/ambassador. That two brilliant careers were cut short was, perhaps, a “blessing in disguise” too.
The writer is an ex-Army officer, a former member of National Commission for Minorities and a political analyst
