In its April 27 issue, The Economist wrote: “In six weeks’ time Narendra Modi is expected to win a third term as India’s Prime Minister, cementing his status as its most important leader since Nehru”. On June 1, as the polling ended, that conclusion appears less certain. To decipher the political outcome’s impact on India’s foreign policy requires some caveats.
Three outcomes are possible. One, that the NDA scrapes through despite the BJP falling below its 2019 score of 303, though its allies in the NDA may suffer due to people resenting defection-based, opportunistic alliances. Two, the BJP loses a majority on its own and thus requires allies to be able to form a government. Three, the BJP falls below 240 and cannot form a government without reaching out to some members of the INDIA bloc. The last possibility, remote though it appears today, can have two outcomes: a BJP government with a new Prime Minister or a non-BJP government.
Turning to Indian foreign policy, the Narendra Modi government’s approach has mainly built on past themes. It has not deviated much, in principle, from a traditional commitment to strategic independence and pragmatism. The post-Cold War foreign policy from 1991, of Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, re-balanced relations with the East, by outreach to the 10 Asean nations. It also cultivated the West, especially by seriously engaging the United States. Establishing diplomatic relations with Israel accompanied this policy tweak. All these are still the basis of India’s foreign policy. But Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s contribution has been the personalisation of diplomacy, greater interplay between domestic politics and foreign relations and the active involvement of the huge Indian diaspora in this venture.
First then, how the outreach to the Anglophone nations involved the Indian diaspora as a vital partner. During his first visit to the United States as Prime Minister, a function was organised at New York’s Madison Square Garden in September 2014. External affairs minister S. Jaishankar was then India’s ambassador to the US. His deputy, Taranjit Singh Sandhu, later also ambassador to the US, is now the BJP’s candidate in Amritsar. The 20,000-strong crowd included 40 American Congressmen. That event became the model for subsequent similar events, in the US and elsewhere.
However, this use of the diaspora had implications. First, the divisive and nationalistic rhetoric with a majoritarian slant has worsened the communal divide amongst the diaspora. Considering that the diaspora’s religious mix is entirely different from that in India, with Hindus barely half the total, the rising chants of separatism by segments of the Sikh diaspora have worsened over the last decade.
This began impacting relations with some of those countries when Indian officials were accused of masterminding the killing of pro-Khalistan individuals in Canada and the US. India-Canada relations are still strained, while the United States has quietly tightened the screws as the extradition of an Indian master-conspirator from the Czech Republic to the US nears approval.
Second, the old convention of not taking domestic political differences abroad was abandoned. A coalition government may restore that worthwhile tradition while ensuring a more balanced approach to the diaspora. After all, most of them are foreign citizens, and drawing them into Indian domestic political debate is undesirable. The danger was demonstrated when Narendra Modi indirectly endorsed Donald Trump during a rally at Houston on the eve of the 2020 US presidential election. Fortunately, the winning Democratic candidate, Joe Biden, did not appear to show any resentment.
Third, the BJP’s majoritarian bias and occasional hyper-nationalism has impacted India’s neighbourhood policy. The democratic slide in Bangladesh has been ignored, tying India to the ruling Awami League of Sheikh Hasina. Any change of government will bring a severe backlash. Such a counter-reaction is seen in India’s relations with the new government of the Maldives, which has begun tilting towards China. Nepal and Bhutan are also under intense Chinese pressure to rebalance relations in their favour. Nepal’s criticism of the “Agniveer” recruitment policy and blocking of fresh recruitment of Gurkha soldiers has damaged a strong pillar of bilateral relations.
The Opposition is promising a review of the “Agniveer” scheme if it comes to power. Even a coalition government may be forced to do that.
Fourth, the highly personal relations between Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Mr Modi demonstrated a pro-Israeli tilt after the October 7 attack by Hamas began. This was later corrected, but the lingering empathy for the Israeli leader is still detectable. Any change of government will impact this policy. US President Joe Biden may in fact lose his bid for a second term next November due to his continuing inability to either control Mr Netanyahu or distance himself from him. Any non-Modi government will correct this aberration.
Fifth, the Modi government has frozen relations with Pakistan since the Pulwama terror attack. After the constitutional and political changes in Jammu and Kashmir, even Pakistan threw in the towel. It is possible that even Prime Minister Modi, if he gets a third term, may choose to thaw relations with Pakistan, considering the latest outreach from former Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif blaming his own country for the breach of faith after the Atal Behari Vajpayee government extended a hand of friendship. For this the restoration of Jammu and Kashmir’s statehood would be the minimum Pakistani precondition. Any Opposition-led government may be equally cautious in handling Pakistan as the BJP, if out of power, will target them over the slightest slip-up.
Finally, there shall be continuity in India’s relations with the US and the West, irrespective of who forms the next government. The same would apply to India’s approach to the European Union, Asean, Japan, South Korea and Australia. The Quad, SCO, Brics, etc, will continue to be platforms that India will remain active in. India would aim to ensure they are not captured by any group of nations to use against their rivals in a neo-Cold War. With China, the military stand-off will persist and a dialogue attempted by whoever forms the next government. But China’s unhindered access to the Indian market may certainly be curtailed by a less business-friendly administration.
India has managed so far to escape Western sanctions over democratic slippage, religious bigotry and majoritarianism. A non-BJP or BJP-led coalition government may modify the domestic discourse and conform more to liberal democratic principles. Another Modi government, if based on a BJP majority and only notional ally participation, may prove the veracity of Talleyrand’s quip about the French Bourbon dynasty: “They learned nothing; they forgot nothing”.
