Trump’s theatrics poses new problems for India

On January 27, a week after assuming the presidency and executing multiple executive orders on his electoral agenda like withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and dismantling of former President Barack Obama’s healthcare programme, Donald Trump blocked the entry of citizens of seven Islamic nations into the United States. Refugees cannot enter for 120 days and travellers, including green card holders, for 90 days, till the administration frames more comprehensive rules for vetting.

The nations chosen, the apparent lack of consultation within the US government and complete insensitivity towards sentiments in the Muslim world raised questions about decision-making in the Trump administration. Spontaneous demonstrations within America exposed the divisions at home, but subsequent surveys indicated people largely backed the move, though probably not understanding the legal and constitutional implications. Some federal judges also issued restraining orders, indicating the doubtful legality of some aspects of the decision.

The countries include Libya, Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Somalia and Yemen. Iran has never been named in any terror attack on the US homeland, except one dubious charge of conspiracy to kill the Saudi ambassador in Washington. Iran and Iraq are in fact critical to the battle against ISIS. Iran has deployed senior commanders of its Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) to assist the Syrian Army and draw the Hezbollah  from Lebanon into the pro-Bashir Assad coalition. With Russian air support and defence equipment this coalition helped the Assad regime to roll back ISIS. On the other hand, most of the 9/11 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia, which is not on the US list. Some commentators had quipped  sarcastically that Mr Trump omitted nations where he had his hotels or projects!

Further, if the US has to work with Russia to contain ISIS, then how can Iran, Russia’s collaborator in Syria, be excluded? Seasoned Republican Senator John McCain has lamented that the US action will play into ISIS’ hands as Muslims at large won’t see it as an anti-terror step but simply as Islamophobia.

The manner of decision-making also raises some questions. Mr Trump relied on a small group of White House advisers, bypassing stakeholders in the state department and the department of homeland security. The move to debar green card holders was forced by Stephen Bannon, formerly publisher of Breitbart, a platform for racist and xenophobic propaganda. For Mr Trump, it appears the international is only a factor of the domestic, which explains his inward-looking anti-globalisation vision.

Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud spoke to Mr Trump, though details are unknown. Similarly, the UAE and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council would be working the back-channels using

Mr Trump’s business links with the region. Former President Obama had rebalanced his West Asia policy by endorsing the P5+1 nuclear agreement with Iran. Saudi Arabia and the UAE were upset as since the Iranian revolution America’s Gulf policy has rested on a close alliance with the House of Saud and other GCC members. US intervention in Kuwait in 1991 and Iraq in 2003 were with the GCC’s active collaboration. However, Mr Obama rightly assessed that a war-fatigued America had no stomach to confront ISIS in a third intervention. Calculating that Saudi Arabia and Qatar were more a part of the problem than the solution in Syria, Mr Obama felt that unshackling Iran was in the US interest. Mr Trump, on the other hand, railed against the Iran nuclear deal during his campaign, and has now put Iran on the visa ban list, thereby altering US policy towards the region midstream.

Where does that leave Indian policy towards the Gulf and West Asia? Prime Minister Narendra Modi reportedly plans to visit Israel this summer. Mr Trump has mooted shifting the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and was silent on Israel’s move to extend housing in the occupied West Bank, which the Obama administration was lambasting. India has, meanwhile, reached out to the UAE by hosting Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince as chief guest on Republic Day. A strategic partnership between the two has been announced. But despite declaring a year ago that the UAE will invest $75 billion in India over  the next 10 years and set up a strategic petroleum reserve, progress has been tardy for two reasons. One, there are legacy issues like Etisalat investment in telecommunications, caught in the telecom licence corruption case. Two, the UAE eyes India-Iran relations with concern as India views their relations with Pakistan.

India’s relationship with Iran also faces uncertainty as Tehran now has different priorities from what it had in the 1990s with which India had collaborated while facing a common enemy in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. Iran has expressed interest in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and there is some convergence among Pakistan, Iran and Russia over the ISIS threat getting entrenched in Afghanistan. The other two seem to be buying the Pakistani argument that the Taliban could be an ally to counter ISIS. Thus, as the US begins to erratically reconfigure its policy towards Iran, Gulf and West Asia, Indian options will mutate.

Mr Modi’s gesture in going to Delhi airport to receive Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince might not help with the Muslim vote in the crucial UP election, but it will concern Iran without turning the UAE against Pakistan or making it part with their gold sans profit and sovereign guarantees. The Gulf potentates are used to suitors vying for their wealth. They respond better to honest forthrightness than flattery, as much as the reverse is true for Iran. As Mr Trump complicates the scenario, Russia, China and Pakistan converge to exploit it. Will India respond with strategic precision, or tumble from one theatrical act to another?