The visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to France last week, on July 13-14, where he was invited to be the chief guest at the Bastille Day celebrations, marked 25 years since Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and French President Jacques Chirac elevated the relationship in 1998 to the strategic level. That was after France literally alone stood with India after the 1998 nuclear tests.
Unlike the annual Republic Day parade in New Delhi, where a different foreign dignitary is invited annually, the French do so only occasionally.
The unique and close relationship between India and France dates from soon after India’s independence in 1947. The French atomic energy commission (CEA) had begun working with India’s Atomic Energy Commission soon thereafter, even when the United States and Britain were keeping tight control over nuclear technology sharing. Unlike Portugal, which had made a big fuss over vacating Goa, the French had quietly handed over their Indian colonial possessions, including Puducherry, on November 1, 1954.
The debate between France and the United States on sovereignty and alliances originates from the 1950s over the unwillingness of France to place its military assets under a joint command led by the US. The Fifth Republic, created by President Charles de Gaulle in 1958, rested on ensuring the strategic independence of France. Coincidentally, post-Independence India was likewise moving towards a similar strategic independence of newly decolonised nations. From that yearning was born the non-aligned movement.
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had a special fondness for France, both as a source to diversify Indian defence procurements but also due to her penchant for the French language, which she learnt at school in Switzerland.
The visions of Presidents John F. Kennedy and Charles de Gaulle had differed precisely on the latter seeking more strategic space, especially as regards control over strategic nuclear assets. France shared American values but differed on the amount of dependence Europe must have on the US for its defence against the then Soviet Union. It is the same hymn that President Emmanuel Macron has been singing off and on.
Thus, France has always been the third nation that India has turned to for advanced technologies when US led the attempt to restrict transfer of dual-use technologies, especially after India’s 1974 peaceful nuclear tests.
Therefore, it was not surprising that after 1971, when the bulk of Indian defence requirements were met by the Soviet Union, India always kept the French door open. When the US decided to transfer F-16 planes to Pakistan after it joined the US-Saudi plan in opposing the 1979 Soviet military incursion into Afghanistan, India turned to France. Mirage-2000 planes were inducted in 1985 to augment India’s air power, then almost wholly dependent on Soviet MIGs.
France also extended the honour of being the chief guest at the Bastille Day parade to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2009. The French are adept at marrying commercial interests to strategic imperatives. The current prime ministerial foray has to be seen in this larger context as foreign policy is a process and not a series of managed events. President Macron has been facing domestic opposition with violent street protests over the killing of a non-white youth by the French police. There has also been broad resistance to Mr Macron’s pension reform proposal. Thus, Mr Macron is today a diminished political leader.
Anti-Macron chants were heard during the Bastille Day celebrations. Similarly, the European Parliament debated the worrisome state of Indian democracy and the situation in Manipur. It passed a negative resolution on the eve of Mr Modi’s arrival in Paris. A French magistrate also complicated matters by seeking information from India about alleged bribery in the purchase of 36 Rafale fighters.
The joint statement issued at the end of the visit covers a wide spectrum of issues. In its annexure are steps that both nations envision over the next 25 years, when India completes a century of independence, titled “Horizon 2047 Roadmap”. The emphasis is on co-production and co-development of advanced defence technologies. There is a commitment on Safran helicopter engine technology being shared for the Indian Multi-Role Helicopter project. There was speculation earlier about jet engine technology being shared. Considering that there has just been a US commitment to do the same, perhaps discretion required that the French and US agreements are kept separate.
There are the usual commitments about France supporting the UN Security Council permanent membership of the G-4, a group of Brazil, Germany, India and Japan. The hat is tipped to multilateralism, Indo-Pacific security, counterterrorism, etc. There is an expectation that France will have 20,000 Indian students by 2027. Although France was the first major power to sign a nuclear cooperation agreement with India after the Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver, no concrete projects are yet visible. One of the problems has been the uncertified nature of France’s next generation nuclear reactor technology. The other one about liability, in case of an accident, is less of a hurdle for the French, in comparison to the Americans, as the French government would be the foreign partner, not the private sector. The Scorpene submarine project has worked well so far and is likely to be extended.
So, what really is the convergence of Indo-French interests? On China, President Macron prefers engagement over de-linking as France sees a huge market at risk. India is in the US camp called the Quad, which includes Australia and Japan. On the question of Russia and Ukraine, Mr Macron has tried to mediate without success, though his position will be closer to India’s than that of Nato. France has been irked over the US killing its submarine deal with Australia by offering nuclear submarines and perhaps technology.
For the US, Australia is a frontline state in its China-containment strategy. Mr Macron stirred up a debate by pitching for European strategic autonomy in view of the perceived US unreliability. This, as explained above, is an old De Gaulle-style argument. Mr Macron’s domestic critics describe his foreign policy posturing as an escape from his political problems at home. His campaign pledge in 2017 was titled “Revolution”. His reform stands stymied at home as he explores possibilities of leadership in a European Union rid of the UK. He is exploiting German diffidence, but in the process often finds himself outflanked by European consensus.
The Narendra Modi visit, when seen in this broader context, is not really a diplomatic coup. It is a logical next step by two nations practising strategic autonomy in a world facing great power transition and the resulting contestation.
