America’s President Donald Trump announced his new Afghan policy on August 21, after an in-depth review. He changed three elements in his predecessor Barack Obama’s doctrine. One was a limited surge of 3,000 additional troops, taking the total to around 11,000. He also took timelines off the table, which common sense and military leaders had anyway demanded as withdrawal dates allow the Taliban to, in sporting terms, run out the clock and avoid negotiations. Finally, Mr Trump loosened the rules of engagement, thus liberating field commanders from constraints on the manner and place of deployment.
What caused the real regional churn was his threatening message for Pakistan, seeking more action against terrorists and their sanctuaries while inviting India to increase its development footprint in Afghanistan. This caused sinking morale and ire in Pakistan. In New Delhi, it seemed as if Diwali had come early, and ruling party spokespersons preened on television, using harsh and condemnatory language about Pakistan. External affairs minister Sushma Swaraj took the same line as she turned her UN General Assembly address into a Pakistan-bashing session.
The global Indian vision had been subsumed in a vitriolic Pakistan policy. Pakistan adopted its time-tested methods of mixing ire with self-pity, bemoaning its sacrifices in combating terrorism. The onus for bringing the Taliban to heel was gradually shifted to Afghans or others, claiming it had diminishing influence on the group. Links to the deadly Haqqani Network were denied, but by a magic trick Pakistan got released from the same group the Canadian-US Boyle family abducted since 2012. Mr Trump’s subsequent adulatory tweet saying he looked forward to working with Pakistan caused some discomfort in Delhi. Even Rahul Gandhi hit his target sarcastically, asking whether it was not time for PM Narendra Modi to go hug Mr Trump once again.
In the process, the US objective has been largely lost. Senator John McCain, chairman of the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee, asked appropriately that he would freeze confirmation of new defence appointees until he gets “a more detailed strategy for war in Afghanistan”. Some contours of the new US approach are visible already, though many ambiguities remain.
The Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) met in Muscat, Oman, on October 16. When a senior US official was asked by me why only China was in that group out of the regional powers, besides the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan, the answer was that it was one of many groupings to enable finding a regional consensus on stabilising Afghanistan.
That is easier said than done as President Trump’s refusal to certify that Iran was abiding by the Joint Comprehensive Programme of Action (JCPOA) – the nuclear deal — and dubbing the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) a terrorist organisation is likely to drive Iran to oppose the US’ Afghan policy. It is conjectured both Iran and Russia have been lately offering the Taliban aid and sanctuaries. Thus US-Iran dissonance will breed Iranian non-cooperation or even hostility as the US moves to stabilise Afghanistan. Pakistan is partially right that other regional players are guardians of some elements of the Taliban, thus diminishing Pakistani influence.
Similarly, the Saudi Arabia-led pillorying of Qatar, which is being opposed by Iran and Turkey, will play out in Afghanistan. The only formal Taliban office overseas is in Doha, Qatar. It is now difficult to travel to Doha from many aviation hubs in the Gulf, making contact with Taliban leaders more difficult. Apparently Saudi Arabia and UAE have opened their own channels to the Taliban leadership to remain in play. Thus the Iran-led Shia alliance rubbing against the Sunni alliance led by Saudi Arabia in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen will get reflected in their roles in Afghanistan. However, a shared concern is the resurfacing of ISIS (Daesh) fighters, ejected from their strongholds in Syria and Iraq, in Afghanistan and even Pakistan. They are without a state sponsor as yet and threaten all regional powers. Hopefully no one will start using them in the “Great Game” in the region. Can all regional powers sink their differences to counter them?
India-Pakistan relations remain bogged in mutual recrimination. The Narendra Modi-Ajit Doval doctrine of no dialogue till support to terror ends is unrealistic. At best, Pakistan should be held accountable for attacks traceable to its state agencies. Otherwise the veto on India-Pakistan relations passes into the hands of any single jihadi who is willing to die. Unfortunately, popularly-elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has been decapitated by judicial writ. Pakistan is already in electoral mode with parliamentary elections due next year. Mr Modi faces a crucial Gujarat Assembly election soon, and may even be forced to call early Lok Sabha elections if the economy does not rebound or a bad monsoon is anticipated. Thus, bilateral ties in the foreseeable future will be run by hawks on both sides. Afghanistan can be the greatest confidence-builder between the two nations, or the theatre of extreme offshore rivalry.
The Trump administration will soon realise that no AfPak policy will work unless all regional powers honestly cooperate. The US President’s next visit abroad is to China, Japan and Republic of Korea, with its focus likely to be on containing North Korea with its nuclear weapons. Mr Trump needs to rebalance his approach to South and West Asia if his Afghan policy has to work. Otherwise, ironically, the creator of radical Islamist forces to counter the Soviets in Afghanistan will find the roles reversed, with the Russians using the Taliban to undermine the US in Afghanistan. The Indians may act likewise if they see Pakistan gaining control over the new US Afghan doctrine. The moral is that while tweets can entertain or provoke, they cannot really resolve geostrategic riddles.
