It is easy to be nostalgic about US-India relations. Think of the days when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh would gush to President George W. Bush about Indian people’s “love” for him, or when US President Barack Obama would call our Prime Minister a “wonderful man”. By contrast, the relationship today seems drab and listless. American friends of India point out that they are an endangered species: the constituencies that once lobbied for India are silent, the mood on Capitol Hill is changing, and the administration doesn’t really have anyone to take ownership of ties with India. Indian champions of the relationship agree that New Delhi is largely to blame for this state of affairs. This government, we are told, is devoid of transformative ideas, is susceptible to pesky domestic lobbies, and is saddled with the ingrained anti-Americanism of the Congress Party. Regime change in India is apparently the only hope. Nostalgia, however, is not a good basis for analysing international politics. The US-India honeymoon is indeed over. But contrary to the Cassandras, this is a good thing. No serious partnership can forever continue in the honeymoon mode. The apparent dullness in the relationship is more a sign of its maturity. US-India relations today are broader, deeper and less dependent on single breakthroughs than in the past. To be sure, there is no room for complacency. But this hankering after “big” ideas is a recipe for frustration. US-India relations today function in a context that is considerably different from the one in which important breakthroughs of the past were made. The attacks of 9/11 had dramatically altered the strategic context and pushed to the forefront the issues of terrorism and their state-sponsors. In this scenario, a large democracy like India, which espoused similar interests and values, came to acquire particular importance for the Bush administration. India’s rapid economic growth during these years also suggested that it could play an important balancing role in an Asia where China was emerging as the main competitor of the US. The global financial crisis of 2008 put paid to ideas of a “unipolar moment” for the US. The relative decline of the US was now apparent. So was the importance of avoiding an overtly confrontational course vis-a-vis China. Even the “pivot to Asia” announced by the Obama administration was shot through with ambivalence. Given the state of the US economy, it is hardly surprising that Mr Obama is focused inward. The sharp downturn in the Indian economy, albeit of more recent origin, has had a similar impact on New Delhi. Economic crises of such gravity invariably impinge upon international politics. Think of the state of the “special relationship” between the US and the UK in the early 1930s and for much of the 1970s. We are in the midst of a serious economic slowdown in both the US and India and this is bound to influence a range of possibilities for the relationship. More surprising is the narrative of gloom and doom about India’s economic prospects currently circulating in the US. The stock market’s view — based on the shortest possible time horizon — is hardly suitable for any strategic assessment. It is undeniable that India is close to the trough of an economic slowdown, but this should not obscure the strengths of the Indian economy which will kick-in the medium to long-term: demographic advantage of a young workforce, high rates of saving, declining public debt-to-GDP ratio, and so on. The potential of US-India economic relations remains huge. Endless carping about issues like India’s nuclear liability laws is unhelpful. For one thing, these laws affect other countries as much as the US. For another, the government has indicated its willingness to facilitate, within the ambit of the law, the entry of American firms into this sector. The myopia of the strategic communities in both countries also obscures an important area of potential friction on the economic front. This is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) currently being negotiated by the US with 12 countries, including Australia, Canada, Singapore, Vietnam and Japan among others. The TPP has an ambitious tripartite agenda. It aims at a regular free trade agreement with provisions for protecting intellectual property, creating investor-friendly regulatory frameworks and policies including measures to ensure that state-owned companies “compete fairly” with private companies and do not put the latter at a disadvantage. The TPP is clearly an attempt to create a large trading bloc aimed against China. But it will have serious implications for India as well. It is imperative that the two sides arrive at a clear understanding of the provisions of their TPP as well as its potential ramifications. The other area of strategic significance for both the countries is Afghanistan. The US and India share common objectives in Afghanistan, but have important differences in how to achieve these. The US has been keen to facilitate a settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban. India, however, has cautioned against going too far in appeasing the Taliban. These debates have now acquired an academic quality. The fact is that the reconciliation process has proved far more chaotic and far less amenable to anyone’s control than anticipated. The drawdown of US forces next year will occur in an unclear political and military context. It is all the more important, therefore, that the two sides deepen their engagement on Afghanistan. Above all, the two sides must focus their strategic vision firmly on the Asia-Pacific. New Delhi shares Washington’s assessment about the inter-linked security challenges in the Indian and Pacific oceans. Both sides want open and balanced security architecture in Asia that precludes the possibility of domination by any power and ensures adherence to international law and norms. In the past, both India and the US have been a bit unsure about how far the other side was willing to go in ensuring this outcome. India, its part, has moved ahead in forging a strong strategic partnership with Japan. This should impart momentum to security ties with the US as well. In short, the greatest opportunities and challenges for US-India relations lie ahead of us — and not behind us. Instead of pining for another big idea or dramatic breakthrough, we must roll-up our sleeves and get down to work.
The writer is a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi
