K.C. Singh | Can Bimstec help to counter Trump’s anti-global agenda?

Prime Minister Narendra Modi will travel to Thailand later this week for the sixth summit of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (Bimstec), which will be held on April 4. He will then visit Sri Lanka on the return journey. This is a seven-nation group, five from South Asia and two from Southeast Asia. The last summit was in 2022, in a post-Covid world.

The group hived off five members from the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (Saarc), an organisation that has got stymied due to India-Pakistan differences, especially over Pakistani abetment of anti-India terrorism. Thus Bhutan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka combined with two Indian Ocean nations -- Myanmar and Thailand, both members of the ten-nation Asean (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). Bimstec became a bridge of sorts between South Asia and Southeast Asia.

All groupings get impacted by the vagaries of their domestic politics and their geopolitical challenges. In 1997, when Bimstec was established, India had Inder Kumar Gujral, first as external affairs minister and then as Prime Minister. His “Gujral Doctrine” enunciated positive engagement with neighbours, even if involving unilateral concessions. His successor, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, despite leading a more right-wing BJP-NDA government, mostly adopted the Gujral line. The next Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, was if anything a Gujral clone. Thus, during the organisation’s first two decades, till 2014, Indian foreign policy stuck to positive regional engagement. The Narendra Modi government too emulated the same at least regarding the Bimstec nations.

But most member states experienced domestic upheavals. In Nepal, constitutional monarchy was established in 1990, with King Birendra allowing democratic forces a role in governance. But his assassination in 2001 boosted the Communist political forces, leading eventually to the monarchy’s abolition in 2008.

The Communist parties thereafter acquired power, ruling alone or in an alliance, leading to Chinese influence increasing dramatically. The Nepalese monarchy had always played India against China, for optimum gain, without getting drawn into Sino-Indian differences. China naturally resented any group that excluded it and presented India an opportunity to enlarge influence amongst the Bimstec members.

Bhutan is perhaps the only member which, despite the Chinese allurements and pressure, has basically maintained balanced relations with India. But India has had to make greater efforts to retain primacy in Bhutan’s diplomatic priorities.

Bangladesh, on the contrary, presents a mixed picture. After the restoration of democracy in 1991, the first Prime Minister, Begum Khaleda Zia of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), mostly India-sceptic, ruled till 1996. She was back in power during 2001-06. The India-friendly Sheikh Hasina ruled during the remainder of the 34 years during which the two leaders alternated in power. Bimstec was established when Sheikh Hasina was Prime Minister, thus limiting Chinese ability to manipulate Bangladesh regarding Bimstec. But when Sheikh Hasina got ousted, after prolonged student protests in 2024, the China factor reappeared.

The recent visit to Beijing by chief adviser Muhammad Yunus, with a huge delegation, reflects that. On the other hand, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has not yet even met Mr Yunus, despite the anti-Hindu and anti-Awami League developments in Bangladesh.

Sri Lanka also had some governments advocating closer economic ties with China and a diminished role for India. President Mahinda Rajapaksa, in power during 2005-15, adopted a distinct pro-China stance, but in the process exacerbated Sri Lanka’s national debt. His greatest achievement was his defeat of the LTTE – the main Tamil rebel organisation -- in 2009. But excessive tax cuts, a misguided agricultural policy, including a ban on chemical fertilisers, and excessive monetary financing caused a financial crisis. Although his brother won back the presidency in 2019, economic mismanagement got him ousted too in 2022, following public protests. His successor Ranil Wickremesinghe restored warmth to ties with India, but the landslide victory of President Anura Kumara Dissanayake in 2024 again presents a challenge. The China factor is back in play though the new government claims maintaining balanced dealings with India and China.

That leaves Myanmar and the current Bimstec chair Thailand. The massive 7.7 magnitude earthquake on March 28, causing extensive loss of life in the former, is distracting from the Bimstec summit. The next chair happens to be Bangladesh, which may complicate the group’s functioning, with the rising Sino-Pakistani influence there. Nevertheless, Bimstec has made gradual progress, despite some of the factors referred to here. There are 14 priority areas identified, which have been further condensed to seven sectors, with each member assigned a lead role in those areas.

Thus, Bangladesh covers “Trade, Investment and Development”. Bhutan handles “Environment and Climate Change”; while India deals with “Security and Energy”. Myanmar is in charge of “Agriculture and Food Security”; with Nepal dealing with “People-to-People Contacts”. Finally, Sri Lanka handles “Science, Technology and Innovation”. A Bimstec Free Trade Agreement (FTA) is also in the works.

The gap between the declared vision and reality is obvious. However, with US President Donald Trump’s onslaught on free trade and globalisation, organisations like Bimstec assume far greater relevance. The trade between its members has grown and now touches $ 53.4 billion. The Indian urgency to more align its tariffs with global standards, in view of the Trumpian threats, is encouraging accelerated progress on stalled FTAs, especially with the European Union. China may also find it useful to work with regional groups like Bimstec to counter the US tariff war.

One low-hanging fruit is connectivity among the seven-member group. Maritime connectivity is easier to facilitate than making the overland connection operational, linking India’s Northeast to Thailand via Myanmar. The problem is the civil war in Myanmar and now a less-than-friendly government in Bangladesh.

The danger lurks of radical forces regaining ascendancy in Bangladesh and fuelling instability or even militancy in India’s entire Northeast region.

In conclusion, India can be a stabilising force in the Bimstec covered region or an object of quiet derision. This is because four of its members are Buddhist, two Hindu-majority, though Communist Nepal is secular, and one Islamic. With US President Donald Trump championing a White-Christian hegemonic model espousing isolationist nationalism, India has extremely limited options. It can succumb to a Hindu-majoritarian, US-like, xenophobic order or support a liberal global order, in line with its founding principles, in cooperation with Europe, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom. Ritually attending regional summits without demonstrating a commitment to liberal values is unlikely to earn either respect or success.