Syed Ata Hasnain | Worries on the east flank: Try to revive old goodwill
Exploring the complexities of the Bangladesh-India relationship, balancing national pride and strategic diplomacy
In recent weeks the national capital has had more than its share of well-attended seminars on Bangladesh, proving just how much interest people have in issues concerning relations with key neighbours. Bangladesh is one of our most important neighbours with whom we have had a warm relationship at most times. No doubt, its national pride has disliked what the people of Bangladesh consider India’s allegedly condescending attitude, especially in the context of the war which led to Bangladesh’s independence. They consider India’s claims of military victory over Pakistan and its contribution to Bangladesh’s independence as highly exaggerated. I, for one, remained aware of this quite early in life, by the time I was a middle-ranking officer of the Indian Army.
Many in India can’t fathom why India’s sacrifice of its soldiers is not acknowledged in a transformational way by Bangladesh. There have been joint functions on anniversaries of the war, victories and achievement of nationhood, but these have never been heartily acknowledged even by the intellectual community in that country. Analysing further, it appears to reveal a sense of national egos which could somehow never converge to make this phenomenon a winner for both sides. In one of the first conversations after the August 5, 2024 events in Dhaka, Bangladeshi friends, all of them great intellectuals in their own right, made it a point to rub it into me. Their narrative was that India failed to appreciate the sentiment in their nation, the demand for true democracy, and that we continued to harp on old narratives of a relationship based upon the 1971 liberation war.
In my very first exposure abroad as part of an United Nations contingent from India, I served with the Bangladesh Army in two missions. The officers of the two armies were the best of friends but I sensed the restlessness in our counterparts whenever we attributed Bangladesh’s independence to the war of 1971. For them it was as if it never happened, and even if it did, only they fought and we Indians were in a supporting role. Belonging to a bigger nation and a bigger Army, which effectively is the mother Army of the sub-continent, it was up to us to ensure we broached these issues no further and the relationship thereafter remained the best ever. It seems that is a policy the Indian armed forces subsequently unofficially adopted in our relationship with the Bangladesh armed forces, taking a lower rung in the ladder of significance and military pride, and never projecting our achievements of 1971 in an obtrusive way. We did this very consciously even with the officer representatives from Bangladesh when they came for the numerous courses that are subscribed to by them in our military training institutions. Lecturing at these for over a decade, it has always been my policy to have a special word for the representatives from Bangladesh and, in particular, a round of praise for the professionalism they display in UN missions. Why upset a neighbour with ego or wearing our pride on the sleeve. Not many would agree with this, and I respect that sentiment too. Letting Bangladesh know this is important too.
I even visited Bangladesh some years after having attended a few training courses abroad with several officers from the Bangladesh armed forces. I had the proud privilege of speaking at the Bangladesh Institute of Strategic Studies in Dhaka and at the well-appointed National Defence College too. I carried forward my policy and that of the Indian armed forces to Dhaka and spent a few days visiting old friends and meeting very senior officers, always conscious of the necessity of being correct in my approach.
Mine is not an isolated case; almost the entire Indian armed forces have meticulously followed this. That is why some great relationships exist between the officers of the two forces. How effectively can we put this to use to overcome this sudden downturn in our mutual relationship? I am pained to see some photographs flashing around displaying the presence of Bangladesh military delegations in Rawalpindi, calling on the Pakistan Army Chief; these have always visited Pakistan in the past too. At whose behest these images are floating around on the social media needs no rocket science to ascertain; the masters of subterfuge and psychological warfare, the Pakistan military’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) agency. The fissures within Pakistan in 1971 led us to war and the creation of Bangladesh. Fifty-four years later, an imaginary fusion is being attempted between the two estranged parts of former united Pakistan. Fission and fusion are both dangerous processes as they result in uncontrollable energy. What the Bangladesh armed forces leadership needs to realise is that turning the tide of history may never be possible. It is being cultivated with narratives which are dangerous and constantly remind of good times which never existed; those of cordiality and joint nationhood. The concept of a nation with two geographically separated parts and distinctive ethnicity, language and culture, is itself a travesty so aptly exemplified by the events of 1970-71. I do agree that in geopolitics there are no permanent friends and enemies, but 1971 cannot just be a forgotten era for Bangladesh and Pakistan.
India, with its typical quiet diplomacy, has adopted a mature approach towards the events in Bangladesh and the attempts to bait it. We have been strongly expressive about touchy issues of the protection of minorities and sanctuaries to separatist leaders. Perhaps it is time to change the chord of diplomacy by reaching out to the Bangladesh military too. In the prevailing circumstances, it could prove to be the sanest of all agencies there, and the Bangladesh Army Chief has been making the right gestures as well. Our intent should be clear: prevention of the spread of radicalism into institutions. The Army leadership in Bangladesh will probably itself realise that one of the most dangerous trends that occur with revolutions is the entry of radicals into uniform and governance. Egypt overcame this within a year of the arrival of Mohammad Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood following the Arab Spring, as the head of state, with Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, the then Egyptian Army Chief, assuming power. It remains free of the radical footprint in its governance.