Krishnan Srinivasan | Will Trump disorder lead to reset in global system?

The recent war of words between US President Donald Trump and Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, culminating in the extraordinary shouting match in the Oval Office last Friday, may be an indication that the relationship between the two countries had irretrievably broken down. But the reaction to this spat should not be overstated; the media and the social media in particular have debased the conventions of intercourse between statesmen and politicians to such a great extent that extreme language and absurd allegations have become the contemporary norm, and no country is immune from this disease — in India, we experience it daily between the government and its cheerleaders and the Opposition. But Mr Zelenskyy should recall that Mr Trump has a thin skin and a long memory, and is unlikely to forgive and forget.

Indeed, the bad blood between the two leaders can be traced back to 2019 when Mr Trump, then in his first term, asked Mr Zelenskyy to reopen an investigation into presidential candidate Joe Biden’s son’s business activities in Ukraine, which Mr Zelenskyy declined to do.

Mr Trump’s rhetorical flourishes often have observers guessing as to his real intentions. Mr Trump is a showman, a disruptor, a politician running on instinct and impulse, but his observations which may at first sight seem unorthodox if not outrageous, usually have an element of logic. In the context of his “America First” doctrine, there is rational thinking in eliminating China’s Belt and Road from the Panama Canal and in fortifying Greenland militarily and developing its mineral resources. And even in Ukraine, mortgaging its rare earth assets for American support. Other schemes such as developing a Palestinian-free Gaza Strip into a seafront riviera are, however, in the realm of illusory aspirations hedged in with improbable and deplorable preconditions.

Mr Trump has little concern for Europe as an economic or strategic partner, which deprives it of its geopolitical relevance. He proposes raising the obligatory financial contribution of Nato members from two per cent of GDP — only met by 23 out of 32 members — to five per cent, which would be affordable by only a few. This is an argument squarely based on the majority belief of Americans over long decades that Europe enjoys a free ride for its security and prosperity at the expense of the United States. What’s relevant here is that Mr Trump has a popularity rating in the US of 45 per cent, a level not achieved by his predecessor Joe Biden during his entire tenure.

Gallup shows Mr Trump’s popularity among Republicans at a starry 93 per cent, and for foreign policy at 90 per cent, so he has solid backing for his actions from his core supporters.

The extent to which the European leaders have been rattled by Mr Trump’s remarks suggest that his observations are taken seriously in European capitals, which now have to construct a new paradigm of economic and security cooperation. If this process inclines Europe to eschew its inward-looking policies of reliance on the trans-Atlantic alliance and give greater attention to its long-neglected connections in Africa and Asia, this can only be to its benefit and for the promotion of a multi-polar world.

Mr Trump shows no inclination to favour Europe in his approaches to the war in Ukraine. His argument reaches back to the 1990s and the “unipolar moment” when the Cold War came to an end with America’s triumph. The Russians were alarmed by the prospect of Nato’s borders being advanced in Eastern Europe towards their own frontiers, and repeatedly warned that the incorporation of Ukraine in Nato would be a causus belli. These warnings were ignored by Washington, which led to the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Accordingly, Mr Trump has history on his side when he regards Ukraine as being a proxy to a war between the US and Russia, who should therefore both be the principal actors to determine its resolution.

Mr Trump indulges in a foreign policy based on the nineteenth century Palmerston principle that a country should have no eternal allies and no eternal enemies; only eternal interests. Also, like Palmerston’s policies, Mr Trump’s foreign policy and use of rhetoric are based on naked power projection, a leverage enabled by America being the world’s biggest economy, the biggest military, and the US dollar being the foundation of global financial transactions. Few countries have such assets at their disposal, and therefore their ability to deploy hard power projection is severely curtailed. Without this advantage, their ability to use defamatory or belittling language in public against their international adversaries is severely curtailed — apart from which, few if any countries are habituated to deploy in international forums the brashness of rhetoric that is now commonplace in US politics.

Mr Trump’s attitude to governance introduces a new style of politics both domestically and internationally. His repudiation of conventional precedents will have far-reaching effects domestically; in immigration, deregulation, politicisation of government institutions, cuts in government jobs, deployment of trade and tariff pressures, and rejection of climate change mitigation measures. Internationally, the striking change thus far has been Mr Trump’s aggressive attitude towards some of America’s close allies. A review of the way Washington is viewed by its overseas partners appears inevitable, leading to a degree of economic, political and military de-coupling — the incoming Chancellor of Germany, Europe’s biggest economy, already speaks of “independence” from the US. Since around 84 per cent of Democrats support few or none of Mr Trump’s policies, the further fracturing of America’s already polarised society appears inevitable.

Mr Trump’s hard power-based trade and tariff wars satisfy his supporters, who feel marginalised by the globalised economy. This would spell the end of the WTO, already rendered almost ineffective by his White House predecessors. Mr Trump’s unilateral actions throw understandable doubt on the foundational principles of the post-Second World War order, namely, the sovereignty of states, equality of states, territorial integrity, respect for the rule of law; and by implication, the viability of the United Nations and other international organisations established to uphold the values of international conduct.

On the other hand, it would be wise to remain cautious and not to rush to judgment. Mr Trump has been in office for just over one month; it is impossible to accurately predict the course of his presidency. Opposition will arise both at home and abroad to the style and substance of Mr Trump’s policies, and if his early actions are a guide to the rest of his tenure, questions will arise about the continuation of such policies once his four-year term is over.

Krishnan Srinivasan is a former foreign secretary. His latest book is Power, Legitimacy and World Order.