The recent meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Brics Summit in Kazan, Russia, was held out as the potential game-changer that consummated the protracted negotiations to address the April-May 2020 Chinese transgressions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and some other near-term legacy issues. Negotiations that had been ongoing since June 2020.
While both Mr Modi and Mr Xi underscored their commitment to disengagement and restoring tranquility along the LAC, the discrepancies in the official readouts of the meeting released by both the countries highlighted discrepancies, divergences and dichotomies in their respective appreciation of the situation along the LAC.
India's optimistic stance on achieving “complete disengagement” starkly contrasted with China's more cautious position. It illuminated the intricate challenge of restoring the pre-2020 status quo along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Something that the Government of India has held out as a non-negotiable redline for the past 53 months now.
India asserts that the de facto border extends for 3,488 km, while China contends it is significantly shorter. Beijing claims approximately 90,000 square kilometres of Indian territory in the northeastern region, including Arunachal Pradesh, while New Delhi maintains that 38,000 square kilometres in Aksai Chin is part of Ladakh. Despite considerable focus on the disengagement efforts in Depsang and Demchok, numerous such unresolved holdovers persist.
Uncertainties Surrounding Pre-2020 Border Dynamics: A crucial aspect of the ongoing disengagement along the LAC is the lack of clarity and opaqueness regarding the situation prior to the April-May 2020 standoff. The Indian government has not adequately disclosed the nature or extent of Chinese incursions or the difficulties encountered by Indian patrols in Ladakh before the escalation in 2020. This opacity has fuelled speculation about the exact terms of disengagement.
The flashpoint of the current border dispute in part can be traced back to China's assertions with regard to where the borders between India and China lay. The Chinese contention in this regard was first articulated by Premier Zhou Enlai in a letter to Prime Minister Nehru on November 7, 1959, and is now colloquially referred to as the Chinese 1959 claim line.
Since then, several areas along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) have remained contentious. Prior to April-May 2020, tensions were already manifesting themselves in critical areas like the Depsang Plains, where Chinese troops frequently impeded Indian patrols at multiple points namely Patrolling Points 10, 11, 11-A, 12, and 13, respectively.
Although India maintained control over the Burtse area to the west, it has always been a flashpoint since a significant standoff in September 2015 when India objected to the construction of a Chinese watchtower. The Galwan Valley had also experienced friction before the violent confrontation in June 2020. Other locations, such as Hot Springs and Gogra Post, where Indian patrols traversed up to Patrolling Point 15 and 17-A, were recurrent sites of stand offs, particularly during the heightened discord between 2017 and 2019. While a mutual understanding of patrol boundaries has historically helped maintain peace, the region remains always susceptible to the potential of escalations.
The 2020 Transgressions: A Turning Point: The Chinese transgressions of April-May 2020 marked a significant escalation in the border dispute, fundamentally changing the dynamics along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). During this period, Chinese troops advanced deep into territory claimed by India, creating new flashpoints in the region. The violent confrontation in the Galwan Valley, which resulted in the loss of 20 Indian soldiers, highlighted the seriousness of the situation. Chinese forces established camps in areas that had previously been jointly patrolled, undermining fragile agreements that had been in place.
Pangong Tso was particularly impacted, with Chinese troops advancing to the northern bank and occupying positions between Finger 4 and Finger 8. This aggressive manoeuvre pushed the boundary westward and initiated a prolonged standoff. Similar incursions were observed in the Gogra and Hot Springs areas, complicating the negotiations for disengagement. In the Depsang Plains, Chinese forces have continued to obstruct Indian patrols, and China's reluctance to withdraw from this region still raises concerns that a complete return to pre-2020 conditions may not be as easily attainable as is being dissimulated by Mandarin’s of the government.
Buffer Zones and Patrolling Restrictions: A New Reality? The escalation in 2020 led to the establishment of buffer zones along the LAC, where both Indian and Chinese forces are prohibited from conducting patrols. While this measure may have alleviated immediate tensions, it has also restricted India’s access to areas that were previously patrolled freely. The creation of buffer zones in the Galwan Valley and Pangong Tso required India to withdraw from strategic positions in exchange for a pullback by Chinese forces. This arrangement has reduced the likelihood of clashes but has raised concerns about India’s long-term territorial control.
Uncertainties persist regarding whether China has fully withdrawn from all areas it occupied during the 2020 standoff. Although disengagement has been achieved in parts of the region, doubts remain about the long-term status of the established buffer zones. Intended to prevent future conflicts, these zones may become a permanent fixture that limits India’s ability to patrol the region effectively.
A January 2023 paper written by a senior police officer vividly detailed that Indian security forces regularly patrolled 65 Patrolling Points (PPs) from the Karakoram Pass to Chumur. However, access to 26 of these PPs has been lost due to the suspension of patrolling by Indian security forces. The paper revealed significant absence of Indian access to PPs 5-17, 24-32, 37, 51, 52, and 62. Notably, unpatrolled PPs include those in the Samar Lungpa area northeast of Daulat Beg Oldi and in the Depsang Plains, as well as PPs along the northern bank of Pangong and other critical locations like Demchok and Charding Nala.
The Need for Greater Transparency: The ongoing disengagement process along the India-China border has significant implications, particularly for states like Arunachal Pradesh, where China asserts claims over the Indian territory. There are growing concerns that these disengagement agreements and resolutions would weaken India’s claims over Aksai Chin, a prerogative aggressively chest thumped by the current government during the Article 370 debate in the Lok Sabha on August 6, 2019. The creation of buffer zones, restrictions on patrolling and other yet unknown details of various disengagement minute may lead to de facto borders that do not align with India’s territorial claims, potentially compromising both its negotiating position in future discussions as well its national security.
While recent agreements can be termed as tangible progress transparency with regard to its terms are the key.
