Patralekha Chatterjee | Too few babies? Reset the India fertility rate debate
The idea of defining a woman primarily as a mother, duty bound to uphold the interests of the nation, is not new. Nor is demographic anxiety fuelled by falling fertility. India stands out because it is the world’s most populous country (pop: 1.4 billion) with a largely youthful population (median age: 28), where many states are simultaneously witnessing a steady decline in fertility, though at a varying rate, and a spike in the number of senior citizens.
It is perhaps the only country where the national TFR (total fertility rate), the average number of children a woman gives birth to in their lifetime, has reached 2.01, while millions remain poor and relatively less educated. This is in stark contrast to other countries where the baby bust or fertility decline started after most citizens reached a certain level of education and affluence.
Arguably, countries need to have a total fertility rate (TFR) of 2.1 to sustain long-term generational replacement of the population. Still, it may seem a little odd that in a country where too many young people are chasing too few jobs, where millions struggle to cope with unemployment, stagnant incomes, rising prices and mounting costs of bringing up and educating children, there is a loud demand for more children.
But like it or not, the fertility debate is now firmly part of India’s political landscape.
In recent months, we have had two chief ministers in South India -- N. Chandrababu Naidu of Andhra Pradesh and M.K. Stalin of Tamil Nadu -- publicly speaking about the need for women in their respective states to have more children. Their fear -- fewer children could lead to diminished political clout for southern India compared to the more populous and already politically powerful northern states. Hindutva proponents often talk about the Muslim minority gradually replacing the Hindu majority.
Now, Mohan Bhagwat, supremo of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the ideological parent of the ruling BJP, has further stirred the pot by publicly exhorting Indian families to have at least three children each.
India needs a debate about its population, just not the one its politicians are instigating.
Declining fertility worries the wealthy West as well as many Asian countries like China, Japan and South Korea. Their governments have been offering an array of incentives to families to have more children. Point to note: Other countries advocating pro-natalist policies are far richer and more developed than India.
Most Indians do not have guaranteed social security or pensions and must survive on family support and savings in old age or in a crisis.
Simply put, many Indian women do not want to have more children because their families do not have the resources to bring them up well. They would rather have fewer children and give them a better education, and quality of life.
Countries which are now actively promoting pro-natalism have had limited success. Take China. A 2023 media report noted that China’s State Council, the country’s chief administrative authority, had rolled out a policy with 13 directives. They aim to boost the country’s declining birth rate, improve childbirth support services, childcare systems, strengthen support in education, housing, and employment. New fertility-friendly measures include maternity insurance to rural migrant workers and people with flexible employment. But here is the rub. These new initiatives are yet to significantly boost China’s birth rate.
A scholarly article by Jiawei Zhao, Yuxuan Li and Wenqi Li in “Biodemography and Social Biology” noted that China’s fertility rate continues to decline despite the government’s fertility-friendly policies. The study explored micro-level causes of China’s declining fertility rate by examining the impact of changes in Chinese work patterns in recent years, particularly the prevalence of overtime work, on fertility intentions. The results show that “weekend overtime, night shifts, and on-call duties exhibit particularly pronounced inhibitory effects on fertility intentions”, according to the researchers.
Many Indian demographers are sceptical about the likelihood of Indian women buying into the vision of a baby boom in a big way.
Dr Srinivas Goli, associate professor, International Institute for Population Sciences, Mumbai, and an eminent demographer cites the examples of China and South Korea which have tried to boost fertility but have had very limited success. He explains why India is unlikely to be able to radically stem falling fertility despite calls for the same by politicians.
“First, India cannot offer the incentives that richer countries facing fertility decline are offering. See the debt ratio GSDP (Gross State Domestic Product). Most states in India have more than two per cent Fiscal Deficit Ratio of GSDP. The fact is that we have reduced our fertility at very lower incomes
“Second, I believe people will not respond significantly to calls to raise births because the costs ultimately fall on families who must take care of the children. All these costs will not be borne by the government -- at the state or at the Centre. It is impossible to do this for a large country with a relatively low per capita income.
“Third, costs of education, health care and housing alongside other basic needs have gone up. People’s aspirations have gone up and they will continue to go up.
“Finally, it is not just about material aspirations. More and more women want to spend longer time in education, seek personal development and self-actualisation; they are increasingly looking for more autonomy and parity in pay with men for work, and in time spent in domestic chores. I do not think the government is able to take care of all these needs.”
There is no getting away from the socio-economic context. Currently, unemployment rates are forcing many Indian men to wait longer to get married. Everyone is looking for stable and decent jobs.
Full-throated calls to Indian families to have more children skirts the progress made in parts of the country stabilising the population and the real challenges that ordinary Indian families face in these increasingly uncertain times. More children do not automatically spell a demographic dividend. If families do not have decent work, income, their children will not be necessarily equipped with the education, skills, health, nutrition that could help them tap into emerging opportunities.
Women will have more babies when they feel emotionally and financially equipped to do so. The population debate must pivot around the kind of population India wishes to have, the interests of ordinary Indian women, rather than just higher fertility.
Till then, Indian women who are expected to have more children in the interests of the nation are entitled to ask what tangible support the nation will offer to help them bring them up well.
